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AGAINST MATERIALISM 
Alvin Plantinga 
Materialism is the idea that human beings are material objects-brains, per-
haps, or some part of the brain-without immaterial selves or souls. I give 
two arguments against materialism. The first is an argument from possibility: 
it is possible that I should exist when no part of my body exists, in which case 
I am not identical with my body or any part of my body. The second is an 
argument from impossibility. If materialism is true, a belief, for example, the 
belief that the British lost the American Revolutionary War, would have to be 
something like an event in one's nervous system. But it is impossible that a 
material process or event be about something; no such process could be about 
the British or anything else. So either there are no beliefs or materialism is 
false. But obviously there are beliefs. 
1 propose to give two arguments against materialism-or, if you think 
that's too negative, two arguments for substantial dualism. 'Substantial' 
is to be taken in two senses: first, the dualism in question, the dualism for 
which 1 mean to argue, is substantial as opposed to trivial; some versions 
of property dualism seem to me to be at best wholly insubstantiaL Second, 
according to the most popular form of dualism - one embraced by Plato, 
Augustine, Descartes and a thousand others-a human person is an im-
material substance: a thing, an object, a substance, a suppositum (as my 
Thomist colleagues would put it), and a thing that isn't material, although, 
of course, it is intimately connected with a material body. But there is also 
the view the name' dualism' suggests: the view according to which a hu-
man person is somehow a sort of composite substance S composed of a 
material substance S* and an immaterial substance S**.1 We can sensibly 
include this view under 'dualism' -provided, that is, that having S* as a 
part is not essential to S. (I add this proviso because my first argument is 
for the conclusion that possibly, 1 exist when my body does not.) 
Perhaps a better name for the view 1 mean to defend is 'immaterial-
is:n'; the view that a human person is not a material object. Of course it's 
far from easy to say just what a material object is.2 For present purposes 
let's put it recursively: a material object is either an atom, or is composed 
of atoms. Thus atoms, molecules, cells, hearts, brains and human bodies 
are all material objects; we'll leave open the question whether such things 
aE, electrons, quarks, protons, fields, and superstrings (if indeed there are 
such things) are material objects. What I'll argue for, accordingly, is the 
view that human persons are not material objects. They are objects (sub-
stances), however; therefore they are immaterial objects. My conclusion, 
of course, is hardly original (going back at least to Plato); my general style 
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4 Faith and Philosophy 
of argument also lacks originality (going back at least to Descartes and 
possibly Augustine). But the method of true philosophy, unlike that of 
liberal theology and contemporary French thought, aims less at novelty 
than at truth. 
Three more initial comments: (i) when I speak of possibility and neces-
sity, I mean possibility and necessity in the broadly logical sense-meta-
physical possibility and necessity, as it is also called. (ii) I won't be arguing 
that it is possible that I (or others) can exist disembodied, with no body at 
all. 3 (iii) I will make no claims about what is or isn't conceivable or imagin-
able. That is because imaginability isn't strictly relevant to possibility at 
all; conceivability, on the other hand, is relevant only if 'it's conceivable 
that p' is to be understood as implying or offering evidence for 'it's pos-
sible that p.' (Similarly for 'it's inconceivable that p.') It is therefore simpler 
and much less conducive to confusion to speak just of possibility. I take it 
we human beings have the following epistemic capacity: we can consider 
or envisage a proposition or state of affairs and, at least sometimes, de-
termine its modal status-whether it is necessary, contingent, or impos-
sible-just by thinking, just by an exercise of thought." 
I. The Replacement Argument: An Argument from Possibility 
I begin by assuming that there really is such a thing, substance or sup-
positum as I, I myself. Of course I'm not unique in that respect; you too are 
such that there really is such a thing as you, and the same goes for every-
body else. We are substances. Now suppose I were a material substance: 
which material substance would I be? The answer, I should think, is that I 
would be my body, or some part of my body, such as my brain or part of 
my brain. Or perhaps I would be something more exotic: an object distinct 
from my body that is constituted from the same matter as my body and 
is colocated with it.s What I propose to argue is that I am none of those 
things: I am not my body, or some part of it such as my brain or a hemi-
sphere or other part of the latter, or an object composed of the same matter 
as my body (or some part of it) and co located with it. (I'll call these 'eli-
gible' material objects.) For simplicity (and nothing I say will depend on 
this simplification) I shall talk for the most part just about my body, which 
I'll name 'B.' (I was thinking of naming it 'Hercules' or maybe Arnold,' but 
people insisted that would be unduly self-congratulatory.) 
The general strategy of this first argument is as follows. It seems pos-
sible that I continue to exist when B, my body, does not. I therefore have 
the property possibly exists when B does not. B, however, clearly lacks that 
property. By Leibniz's Law, therefore (more specifically, the Diversity of 
Discernibles), I am not identical with B. But why think it possible that I ex-
ist when my body does not? Strictly speaking, the replacement argument 
is an argument for this premise. Again, I conduct the argument in the first 
person, but naturally enough the same goes for you (although of course 
you will have to speak for yourself). 
So first, at a macroscopic level. A familiar fact of modern medicine is 
the possibility and actuality of limb and organ transplants and prosthe-
ses. You can get a new heart, liver, lungs; you can also get knee, hip, and 
ankle replacements; you can get prostheses for hands and feet, arms and 
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legs, and so on. Now it seems possible-possible in that broadly logical 
sense-that medical science should advance to the point where I remain 
fully dressed and in my right mind (perhaps reading the South Bend Tri-
bune) throughout a process during which each of the macroscopic parts of 
my body is replaced by other such parts, the original parts being vapor-
ized in a nuclear explosion-or better, annihilated by God. But if this pro-
cess occurs rapidly-during a period of 1 microsecond, let's say-B will 
no longer exist. I, however, will continue to exist, having been reading the 
comic page during the entire process. 
But what about my brain, you ask-is it possible that my brain be re-
placed by another, the brain I now have being destroyed, and I continue 
to exist? It certainly seems so. Think of it like this. It seems possible (in 
the broadly logical sense) that one hemisphere of my brain be dormant 
at any given time, the other hemisphere doing all that a brain ordinarily 
does. At midnight, we can suppose, all the relevant 'data' and 'informa-
tion' is 'transferred' via the corpus callosum from one hemisphere-call it 
'H/ -to the other hemisphere-H2-whereupon H2 takes over operation 
of the body and HI goes dormant. This seems possible; if it were actual, it 
would also be possible that the original dormant half, H2, be replaced by 
a different dormant half (in the same computational or functional state, 
if you like) just before that midnight transfer; then the transfer occurs, 
control switches to the new H2, and HI goes dormant-at which time it 
is replaced by another hemisphere in the same computational or func-
tional condition. In a period of time as brief as you like, therefore, both 
hemispheres will have been replaced by others, the original hemispheres 
and all of their parts annihilated by God. Throughout the whole process I 
serenely continue to read the comics. 
This suffices, I think, to show that it's possible that I exist when neither 
my body nor any part of it exists. What about material objects distinct 
from my body and its parts, but colocated with it (or one of them) and con-
stituted by the same matter as they? I doubt very much that there could 
be any such things. If objects of this kind are possible, however, the above 
argument also shows or at least suggests that possibly, I exist when none 
of them does. For example, if there is such a thing as the matter of which 
B Is composed-if that phrase denotes a thing or object6-it too would be 
destroyed by God's annihilating all the parts of my body. 
Of course very many different sorts of object of this kind -object consti-
tuted by the matter of my body and colocated with it- have been suggest-
ed, and I don't have the space here to deal with them all. However, we can 
offer a version of the replacement argument that will be relevant to many 
of them. Turn from macroscopic replacement to microscopic replacement. 
This could go on at several levels: the levels of atoms, molecules, or cells, 
for example. Let's think about it at the cellular level. It seems entirely pos-
sible that the cells of which my body is composed be rapidly-within a 
microsecond or two-replaced by other cells of the same kind, the orig-
inal cells being instantly destroyed. It also seems entirely possible that 
this process of replacement take place while I remain conscious, thinking 
about dualism and marveling at some of the appalling arguments against 
it produced by certain materialists? Then I would exist at a time at which 
B did not exist. 
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But is it really true that this process of replacement would result in the 
destruction of B? After all, according to current science, all the matter in 
our bodies is replaced over a period of years, without any obvious com-
promise of bodily integrity or identity. As a matter of fact, so they say, the 
matter in our brains is completely replaced in a much shorter time.8 Why 
should merely accelerating this process make a difference?9 
Well, as they say, speed kills. When a cell is removed from an organ-
ism and replaced by another cell, the new cell doesn't become part of the 
organism instantaneously; it must be integrated into the organism and 
assimilated by it. HI What does this assimilation consist in? A cell in a (prop-
erly functioning) body is involved in a network of causal relations; a neu-
ron, for example, emits and responds to electrical signals. A cell receives 
nourishment from the blood, and cooperates with other cells in various 
causal activities. All these things take time-maybe not much time, but 
still a certain period of time. At the instant the new partll is inserted into 
the organism, and until it has begun to play this causal role (both as cause 
and effect), the new part is not yet a part of the organism, but a foreign 
body occupying space within the spatial boundaries of the organism. 
(Clearly not everything, nor even everything organic, within the spatial 
boundaries of your body is part of your body: think of the goldfish you 
just swallowed, or a tapeworm.) Let's use the phrase 'assimilation time' to 
denote the time required for the cell to start playing this causal role. The 
assimilation time is the time required for the cell to become assimilated 
into the body; before that time has elapsed the cell is not yet part of the 
body. To be rigorous, we should index this to the part (or kind of part) and 
the organism in question; different parts may require different periods of 
time for their assimilation by different organisms. For simplicity, though, 
let's assume all parts and organisms have the same assimilation time; this 
simplification won't make any difference to the argument. 
That a given part and organism are such that the time of assimilation for 
the former with respect to the latter is dt, for some specific period of time 
dt, is, I take it, a contingent fact. One thinks the velocity of light imposes a 
lower limit here, but the time of assimilation could be much greater. (For 
example, it could depend on the rate of blood flow, the rate of intracellular 
transport, and the rate at which information is transmitted through neuron 
or nerve.) God could presumably slow down this process, or speed it up. 
There is also what we might call 'the replacement time': the period of 
time from the beginning of the replacement of the first part by a new part 
to the end of the time of the replacement of the last part (the last to be 
replaced) by a different part. The time of replacement is also, of course, 
contingent; a replacement can occur rapidly or slowly. Presumably there 
is no non-zero lower limit here; no matter how rapidly the parts are re-
placed, it is possible in the broadly logical sense that they be replaced still 
more rapidly. 
What's required by the Replacement Argument, therefore, (or at any 
rate what's sufficient for it) is 
(Replacement) It is possible that: the cells in B are replaced by other 
cells and the originals instantly annihilated while I continue to exist; 
and the replacement time for B and those cells is shorter than the as-
similation time. 
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Objections and Replies 
(1) Doesn't a 5tar Trek scenario seem possible, one in which you are 
beamed up from the surface of a planet to an orbiting spacecraft, both 
you, and in this context more importantly, your body surviving the pro-
cess? This objection is relevant to the Replacement Argument, however, 
only if in this scenario your body survives a process in which its matter is 
replaced by other matter, the original matter being annihilated. But that's 
not how the Star Trek scenario works: what happens instead is that the 
matter of which your body is composed is beamed up (perhaps after hav-
ing been converted to energy), not annihilated. You might think of this 
case as one of disassembly (and perhaps conversion into energy) and then 
reassembly. Perhaps your body could survive this sort of treatment; what 
I claim it can't survive is the rapid replacement of the matter in question 
by other matter, the original matter being annihilated. 
(2) I've been assuming that you and I are objects, substances; but that 
assumption may not be as innocent as it looks. Might I not be an event12 -
perhaps an event like a computer's running a certain program? We ordi-
narily think of an event as one or more objects °1 ... On' exemplifying a 
property P or relation R, (where P or R may be complex in various ways 
and, may of course entail extension over time). Perhaps what I am is an 
event involving (consisting in) many material objects (organs, limbs, cells, 
etc.) standing in a complex relation. Then, although I wouldn't be a mate-
rial object, I would be an event involving nothing but material objects-a 
material event, as we might call it; and why wouldn't that be enough to 
satisfy the materialist? 
Further: suppose I were a material event: why couldn't that event per-
sist through arbitrarily rapid replacement of the objects involved in it? 
Think of an event such as a battle; clearly there could be a battle in which 
the combatants were removed and replaced by other combatants with ex-
tremely great rapidity. Let's suppose the commanding officer has an un-
limited number of troops at his command. He needs 1000 combatants at 
any given time: eager to spread the risk, he decrees that each combatant 
will fight for just thirty seconds and then be instantly replaced by another 
combatant. (Imagine that technology has advanced to the point where 
the obvious technical problems can be dealt with.) The battle, we may 
suppose, begins on Monday morning and ends Tuesday night; this one 
event, although no doubt including many subevents, lasts from Monday 
morning to Tuesday night-and this despite the constant and rapid re-
placement of the combatants. Although there are never more than 1000 
troops in the field at anyone time, several million are involved in the 
event, by virtue of those rapid replacements. Of course the replacement 
could be much faster; indeed, there is no logical limit on the rapidity of 
replacement of the combatants, the same event (i.e., the battle) persisting 
throughout. More generally: 
(a) For any duration d and event E and substances 51,52 ... 5n involved 
in E, if 51,52 .•• 5n are replaced by substances 5n+1, 5n+2 ... 5n+n during 
d, then there is an event E* that persists through d and is such that at 
the beginning of d, E* involves 51' 52 ... 5n, and at the end of d does not 
involve 51' 52 ... 5n, but does involve 5n+1, 5n+2 ••• 5n+n • 
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So events have a certain modal flexibility along this dimension.13 Now 
suppose I were an event. Why couldn't the event which I am persist through 
arbitrarily rapid replacement of the material objects involved in it? Is there 
any reason, intuitive or otherwise, to suppose not? Perhaps a material sub-
stance can't survive the arbitrarily rapid replacement of its parts; is there 
any reason to think a material event suffers from the same limitation? 
(3) We can conveniently deal with objection (2) by considering it to-
gether with another. According to Peter van Inwagen, human beings are 
material objects; a material object, furthermore is either an elementary 
particle or a living being. Living beings comprise the usual suspects: or-
ganisms such as horses, flies, and oak trees, but also cells (neurons, for 
example), which may not rise to the lofty heights of being organisms, but 
are nonetheless living beings. It is living horses, flies etc., that are objects or 
substances. Indeed, 'living horse' is a pleonasm. On van Inwagen's view, 
there aren't any dead horses; a 'dead horse,' strictly speaking, is not really 
a thing at all and a fortiori not a horse; it is instead a mere heap or pile of 
organic matter. Once that horse has died, its remains (as we say in the case 
of human beings) are a mere assemblage of elementary particles related in 
a certain way; there is no entity or being there in addition to the particles. 
A living horse, on the other hand, is a thing, a substance, in its own right 
and has as parts only other living beings (cells, e.g.) and elementary par-
ticles. Strictly speaking, therefore, there isn't any such thing as a hand, or 
arm or leg or head; rather, in the place we think of as where the hand is, 
there are elementary particles and other living things (cells, e.g.) related 
in a certain way. 
But by virtue of what is this horse a thing or a substance: under what 
conditions does an assemblage of elementary particles constitute a thing, 
i.e., become parts of a substance? When those particles are involved in a 
certain complex event: a life. Elementary particles can stand in many rela-
tions and be involved in many kinds of events; among these many kinds 
of events are lives; and when elementary particles are involved in that sort 
of event, then they become parts of a substance. Further, the object, that 
living thing, exists when and only when the event which is its life exists 
or occurs. Still further (and here we may be taking leave of van Inwagen) 
the survival and identity conditions of the organism are determined by 
the survival and identity conditions of that event, that life. Consider an 
organism 0 and its life L(O). The idea is that 0 exists in just those possible 
worlds in which L(O) occurs; more precisely, 0 and L(O) are such that for 
any world Wand time t, 0 exists in W at t if and only if L(O) exists at t in 
W. Hence 
(b) Given an organism 0 and the event L(O) that constitutes its life, 
necessarily, 0 exists at a time t just if L(O) occurs at t. 
(We can think of 'exists' as short for 'exists, did exist, or will exist'; simi-
larly for 'occurs.') 
This elegant position certainly has its attractions. It's not wholly clear, 
of course, that there are any elementary particles (perhaps all particles are 
composed of other particles so that it's composition all the way down, 
or perhaps what there really is, is 'atomless gunk' configured in various 
ways14); perhaps electrons, etc., aren't particles at all, but perturbances of 
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fields; and it's a bit harsh to be told that there really aren't any such things 
as tables and chairs, automobiles and television sets. Nevertheless van 
Inwagen's view is attractive. Now suppose we add (b) to van Inwagen's 
view; the resulting position suggests an objection to the Replacement 
Argument (an objection that doesn't have van Inwagen's blessing). For 
(again) why couldn't the event which is my life persist through arbitrarily 
rapid replacement of the objects it involves? Is there any intuitive support 
for the thought that there is a lower limit on the rapidity of replacement 
through which this event could persist? If not, then even if I couldn't be a 
material substance, I could be a material event; no doubt the materialist 
would find this materialism enough. 
We can respond to these two objections together. According to objection 
(2), I can sensibly think of myself as an event: presumably the event that 
constitutes my life. Now perhaps the objector's (a) is true: for any replace-
ment, no matter how rapid, there will be an event of the sort (a) suggests. 
But of course nothing follows about the modal properties of any particular 
event. So suppose I am an event: nothing about my modal properties fol-
lows from or is even suggested by (a); and it is my modal properties that 
are at issue here. In particular, it doesn't follow that if I were my life, then I 
could have continued to exist (or occur) through the sort of rapid replace-
ment envisaged in the Replacement Argument. Now turn to (3). Suppose 
for the moment we concede (b): we still have no reason to think my life, 
that particular event, the event which is in fact my life, could have sur-
vived those rapid replacements of the objects involved in it. No doubt for 
any such replacement event, there is an event of the sort suggested by (a); 
nothing follows with respect to the modal properties of the event which 
is in my life. In particular it doesn't follow that it could have persisted 
through the sort of rapid replacements we've been thinking about. 
So (a) is really a red herring. But there is a more decisive response here. 
Objection (3) endorses (b), the claim that there is an event-my life-such 
that, necessarily, I exist just when it does. Objection (2) also (and trivially) 
entails (b); if I just am my life then, naturally enough, (b) is true. Fortu-
nately, however, (b) is false. For (b) entails 
(c) I and my life are such that necessarily, I exist just when it occurs, 
and (as I'll now argue) (c) is false. 
Why think (c) is false? First, it's far from clear just which properties 
events have essentially. Some think it essential to any event that it include 
just those objects that it does in fact include, and also that these objects 
exemplify just the properties and relations they do in fact exemplify. If 
that were true, an event involving an object a's having a certain property 
could not have occurred if a had not had that property. But that seems a 
bit strong; surely the Civil War, for example, (that very event) could have 
taken place even if a particular Confederate soldier had not trodden on a 
blade of grass he did in fact step on. Still, there are serious limits here. Per-
haps the Civil War (the event which is the Civil War) would have existed 
even if that soldier hadn't trampled that blade of grass; but the Civil War 
(that event) could not have lasted only ten minutes. There is a possible 
world in which there is a very short war between the states (and it could 
even be called 'The Civil War'); but there is no possible world in which the 
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war that did in fact take place occurs, and lasts for only ten minutes. Simi-
larly for my life (call it 'L'): if (b) is true, then of course L has existed exactly 
as long as I have. L, therefore, has by now existed for more than seventy 
years. Clearly enough, however, I could have existed for a much shorter 
time: for example, I could have been run over by a Mack truck at the age 
of six months (and not been subsequently sustained in existence by God). 
L, however, could not have existed or occurred for only those first few 
months, just as the Civil War could not have existed or occurred for only 
ten minutes. There is a possible world in which I exist for just those first 
few months, or even for just a few minutes; there is no possible world in 
which L exists for that period of time. Of course, if I had existed for, say, 
just ten minutes, there would have been an event which would have been 
my life, and which would have existed for just ten minutes; that event, 
however, would not have been L. We can put it like this: in any world in 
which I exist, there is an event which is my life; but it is not the case that 
there is an event which is my life, and which is my life in every world in 
which I exist. 
(c), therefore, is false; it is not the case that I and the life of my body 
are such that necessarily, we exist at all the same times-that is, it is not 
the case that I and the life of my body are such that I have essentially the 
property of existing when and only when it does. But if (c) is false, the 
same goes for (b); since objections (2) and (3) both entail (b), both objec-
tions fail. 
(4) If, as I say is possible, the replacement time for B and those parts 
is shorter than the assimilation time, there will be a brief period during 
which I don't have a body at alPs I will no longer have B, because all of 
B's parts have been replaced (and destroyed) during a time too brief for 
the new parts to be assimilated into B. I won't have any other body either, 
however; I won't have a body distinct from B, because there hasn't been 
time for these new parts to coalesce into a body. I therefore have no body 
at all during this time; there is no body that is my body at this time. How, 
then, can I continue to be conscious during this time, serenely reading the 
comics? Isn't it necessary that there be neurological activity supporting 
my consciousness during this time, if I am to be conscious then? 
But is it logically necessary that there be neurological or other physical 
activity supporting my consciousness at any time at which I am conscious? 
That's a whopping assumption. The most I need for my argument is that 
it is logically possible that I remain conscious during a brief period in which 
no neurological activity is supporting my consciousness; that's compatible 
with its being causally required that there be neurological activity when I 
am conscious. My entire argument has to do with what could happen; not 
with what would as a matter of fact happen, if this sort of replacement were 
to occur.16 So the most that argument needs is that possibly, I exist and am 
conscious when no neurological activity is supporting my consciousness. I? 
But the fact is it doesn't require even that. For consider a time t after the end 
of the replacement time but before the assimilation time has ended; let t be 
as close as you please to the end of the replacement time. At t, the replac-
ing elements, the new parts, haven't yet had time to coalesce into a body. 
Nonetheless, anyone of the new elements could be performing one of the 
several functions it will be performing when it has been integrated into a 
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functioning human body. It could be playing part of the whole causal role 
it will be playing when the assimilation time has elapsed. In particular, 
therefore, the new neurons, before they have become part of a body, could 
be doing whatever it is they have to do in order to support consciousness. 
Accordingly, my argument requires that possibly I am conscious when I 
do not have a body; it does not require that possibly I am conscious when 
no neuronal or neurological activity is occurring. 
II. Can a Material Thing Think? An Argument from Impossibility 
The Replacement Argument is an argument from possibility; as such, it 
proceeds from an intuition, the intuition that it is possible that my bodily 
parts, macroscopic or microscopic, be replaced while I remain conscious. 
But some people distrust modal intuitions. Of course it's impossible to do 
philosophy (or for that matter physics) without invoking modal intuitions 
of one sort or another or at any rate making modal declarations of one 
sort or another. IS Still, it must be conceded that intuition can sometimes 
be a bit of a frail reed. True, there is no way to conduct philosophy that 
isn't a frail reed, but intuition is certainly fallible. Further, some might 
think modal intuitions particularly fallible-although almost all of the in-
tuitions involved in philosophy have important modal connections. Still 
further, one might think further that intuitions of possibility are especially 
suspect.19 That is because it seems easy to confuse seeing the possibility of p 
with failing to see the impossibility of p. You can't see why numbers couldn't 
be sets; it doesn't follow that what you see is that they could be sets. Maybe 
I can't see why water couldn't be composed of something other than H20; 
it doesn't follow that what I see is that water could be something other 
than H 20. And perhaps, so the claim might go, one who finds the replace-
ment argument attractive is really confusing seeing the possibility of the 
replacements in question with failing to see their impossibility. Granted: 
I can't see that these replacements are impossible; it doesn't follow that 
what I see is that they are indeed possible. 
To be aware of this possible source of error, however, is to be forewarned 
and thus forearmed. But for those who aren't mollified and continue to 
distrust possibility intuitions, I have another argument for dualism-one 
that depends on an intuition, not, this time, of possibility, but of impos-
sibility. One who distrusts possibility intuitions may think more kindly of 
intuitions of impossibility-perhaps because she thinks that for the latter 
there isn't any obvious analogue of the possible confusion between fail-
ing to see that something is impossible with seeing that it is possible. Or 
rather, while there is an analogue-it would be confusing failure to see the 
possibility of p with seeing the impossibility of p-falling into that confu-
sion seems less likely. In any event, the argument I'll now propose is for 
the conclusion that no material objects can think -i.e., reason and believe, 
entertain propositions, draw inferences, and the like. But of course I can 
think; therefore I am not a material object. 
A. Leibniz's Problem 
1 (and the same goes for you) am a certain kind of thing: a thing that can 
think. I believe many things; I also hope, fear, expect, anticipate many 
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things. I desire certain states of affairs (desire that certain states of affairs 
be actual). I am capable of making decisions. I am capable of acting, and 
capable of acting on the basis of my beliefs and desires. I am conscious; 
and conscious of a rich, kaleidoscopic constellation of feeling, mental im-
ages, beliefs, and ways of being appeared to, some of which I enjoy and 
some of which I dislike. Naturally enough, therefore, I am not identical 
with any object that lacks any or all of these properties. What I propose to 
argue next is that some of these properties are such that no material object 
can have them. Again, others have offered similar arguments. In particu-
lar, many have seen a real problem for materialism in consciousness: it is 
extremely difficult to see how a material object could be conscious, could 
enjoy that vivid and varied constellation of feelings, mental images and 
ways of being appeared to. Others have argued that a material object can't 
make a decision (although of course we properly speak, in the loose and 
popular sense, of the chess playing computer as deciding which move to 
make next). These arguments seem to me to be cogent.20 Here, however, I 
want to develop another argument of the same sort, another problem for 
materialism, a problem I believe is equally debilitating, and in fact fatal to 
materialism. Again, this problem is not a recent invention; you can find it 
or something like it in Plato. Leibniz, however, offers a famous and par-
ticularly forceful statement of it: 
17. It must be confessed, moreover, that perception, and that which 
depends on it, are inexplicable by mechanical causes, that is by figures 
and motions. And supposing there were a machine so constructed 
as to think, feel and have perception, we could conceive of it as en-
larged and yet preserving the same proportions, so that we might 
enter it as into a mill. And this granted, we should only find on visit-
ing it, pieces which push one against another, but never anything by 
which to explain a perception. This must be sought for, therefore, in 
the simple substance and not in the composite or in the machine.21 
Now Leibniz uses the word 'perception' here; he's really thinking of 
mental life generally. His point, in this passage, is that mentallife-per-
ception, thought, decision-cannot arise by way of the mechanical inter-
action of parts. Consider a bicycle; like Leibniz's mill, it does what it does 
by virtue of the mechanical interaction of its parts. Stepping down on the 
pedals causes the front sprocket to tum, which causes the chain to move, 
which causes the rear sprocket to tum, which causes the back wheel to 
rotate. By virtue of these mechanical interactions, the bicycle does what 
it does, i.e., transports someone from one place to another. And of course 
machines generally-jet aircraft, refrigerators, computers, centrifuges-do 
their things and accomplish their functions in the same way. So Leibniz's 
claim, here, is that thinking can't arise in this way. A thing can't think by 
virtue of the mechanical interaction of its parts. 
Leibniz is thinking of mechanical interactions-interactions involving 
pushes and pulls, gears and pulleys, chains and sprockets. But I think he 
would say the same of other interactions studied in physics, for example 
those involving gravity, electro-magnetism, and the strong and weak nucle-
ar forces. Call these 'physical interactions.' Leibniz's claim is that thinking 
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can't arise by virtue of physical interaction among objects or parts of ob-
jects. According to current science, electrons and quarks are simple, with-
out parts.22 Presumably neither can think - neither can adopt propositional 
attitudes; neither can believe, doubt, hope, want, or fear. But then a proton 
composed of quarks won't be able to think either, at least by way of physi-
cal relations between its component quarks, and the same will go for an 
atom composed of protons and electrons, a molecule composed of atoms, a 
cell composed of molecules, and an organ (e.g., a brain), composed of cells. 
H electrons and quarks can't think, we won't find anything composed of 
them that can think by way of the physical interaction of its parts. 
Leibniz is talking about thinking generally; suppose we narrow our fo-
cus to belief(although the same considerations apply to other propositional 
attitudes). What, first of all, would a belief be, from a materialist perspec-
tive? Suppose you are a materialist, and also think, as we ordinarily do, 
that there are such things as beliefs. For example, you hold the belief that 
Marcel Proust is more subtle than Louis L' Amour. What kind of a thing is 
this belief? Well, from a materialist perspective, it looks as if it would have 
to be something like a long-standing event or structure in your brain or 
nervous system. Presumably this event will involve many neurons related 
to each other in subtle and complex ways. There are plenty of neurons to 
go around: a normal human brain contains some 100 billion. These neu-
rons, furthermore, are connected with other neurons at synapses; a single 
neuron can be involved in several thousand synapses, and there are some 
:l015 synaptic connections. The total number of possible brain states, then, is 
absolutely enormous, vastly greater than the 1080 electrons they say the uni-
verse contains. And the total number of possible neuronal events, while no 
doubt vastly smaller, is still enormous. Under certain conditions, groups of 
neurons involved in such an event fire, producing electrical impulses that 
can be transmitted (with appropriate modification and input from other 
structures) down the cables of neurons that constitute effector nerves to 
muscles or glands, causing, e.g., muscular contraction and thus behavior. 
From the materialist's point of view, therefore, a belief will be a neuro-
nal event or structure of this sort. But if this is what beliefs are, they will 
have two very different sorts of properties. On the one hand there will be 
electrochemical or neurophysiological properties ('NP properties,' for short). 
Among these would be such properties as that of involving n neurons and 
n* connections between neurons, properties that specify which neurons 
are connected with which others, what the rates of fire in the various parts 
of the event are, how these rates of fire change in response to changes in 
Input, and so on. But if the event in question is really a belief, then in ad-
dition to those NP properties it will have another property as well: it will 
have to have a content. It will have to be the belief that p, for some propo-
sition p. If this event is the belief that Proust is a more subtle writer than 
Louis L' Amour, then its content is the proposition Proust is more subtle 
than Louis L'Amour. My belief that naturalism is all the rage these days has 
as content the proposition Naturalism is all the rage these days. (That same 
proposition is the content of the German speaker's belief that naturalism 
is all the rage these days, even though she expresses this belief by utter-
ing the German sentence 'Der Naturalismus ist dieser Tage ganz gross in 
Mode'; beliefs, unlike sentences, do not come in different languages.) It 
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is in virtue of having a content, of course, that a belief is true or false: it 
is true if the proposition which is its content is true, and false otherwise. 
My belief that all men are mortal is true because the proposition which 
constitutes its content is true, but Hitler's belief that the Third Reich would 
last a thousand years was false, because the proposition that constituted 
its content was false. 23 
And now the difficulty for materialism is this: how does it happen, 
how can it be, that an assemblage of neurons, a group of material objects 
firing away has a content? How can that happen? More poignantly, what 
is it for such an event to have a content? What is it for this structured 
group of neurons, or the event of which they are a part, to be related, 
for example, to the proposition Cleveland is a beautiful city in such a way 
that the latter is its content? A single neuron (or quark, electron, atom or 
whatever) presumably isn't a belief and doesn't have content; but how 
can belief, content, arise from physical interaction among such material 
entities as neurons? As Leibniz suggests, we can examine this neuronal 
event as carefully as we please; we can measure the number of neurons it 
contains, their connections, their rates of fire, the strength of the electrical 
impulses involved, the potential across the synapses-we can measure all 
this with as much precision as you could possibly desire; we can consider 
its electro-chemical, neurophysiological properties in the most exquisite 
detail; but nowhere, here, will we find so much as a hint of content. In-
deed, none of this seems even vaguely relevant to its having content. None 
of this so much as slyly suggests that this bunch of neurons firing away is 
the belief that Proust is more subtle than Louis L' Amour, as opposed, e.g., 
to the belief that Louis L' Amour is the most widely published author from 
Jamestown, North Dakota. Indeed, nothing we find here will so much as 
slyly suggest that it has a content of any sort. Nothing here will so much 
as slyly suggest that it is about something, in the way a belief about horses 
is about horses. 
The fact is, we can't see how it could have a content. It's not just that we 
don't know or can't see how it's done. When light strikes photoreceptor 
cells in the retina, there is an enormously complex cascade of electrical 
activity, resulting in an electrical signal to the brain. I have no idea how all 
that works; but of course I know it happens all the time. But the case un-
der consideration is different. Here it's not merely that I don't know how 
physical interaction among neurons brings it about that an assemblage of 
them has content and is a belief. No, in this case, it seems upon reflection 
that such an event could not have content. It's a little like trying to under-
stand what it would be for the number seven, e.g., to weigh five pounds, 
or for an elephant (or the unit set of an elephant) to be a proposition. (Pace 
the late (and great) David Lewis, according to whom the unit set of an 
elephant could be a proposition; in fact, on his view, there are uncount-
ably many elephants the unit sets of which are propositions.) We can't see 
how that could happen; more exactly, what we can see is that it couldn't 
happen. A number just isn't the sort of thing that can have weight; there is 
no way in which that number or any other number could weigh anything 
at all. The unit set of an elephant, let alone the elephant itself, can't be a 
proposition; it's not the right sort of thing. Similarly, we can see, I think, 
that physical activity among neurons can't constitute content. There they 
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are, those neurons, clicking away, sending electrical impulses hither and 
yon. But what has this to do with content? How is content or aboutness 
supposed to arise from this neuronal activity? How can such a thing pos-
sibly be a belief? But then no neuronal event can as such have a content, 
can be about something, in the way in which my belief that the number 
seven is prime is about the number seven, or my belief that the oak tree in 
my backyard is without leaves is about that oak tree. 
Here we must be very clear about an important distinction. Clearly 
there is such a thing as indication or indicator meaning.24 Deer tracks in my 
backyard indicate that deer have run through it; smoke indicates fire; the 
height of the mercury column indicates the ambient temperature; buds on 
the trees indicate the coming of spring. We could speak here of 'natural 
signs': smoke is a natural sign of fire and the height of the mercury column 
lS a natural sign of the temperature. When one event indicates or is a natu-
ral sign of another, there is ordinarily some sort of causal or nomic connec-
tion, or at least regular association, between them by virtue of which the 
first is reliably correlated with the second. Smoke is caused by fire, which 
is why it indicates fire; measles cause red spots on your face, which is why 
red spots on your face indicate measles; there is a causal connection be-
tween the height of the mercury column and the temperature, so that the 
latter indicates the former. 
The nervous systems of organisms contain such indicators. A widely 
discussed example: when a frog sees a fly zooming by, the frog's brain (so 
it is thought) displays a certain pattern of neural firing; we could call such 
patterns 'fly detectors.' Another famous example: some anaerobic marine 
bacteria have magnetosomes, tiny internal magnets. These function like 
compass needles, indicating magnetic north. The direction to magnetic 
north is downward; hence these bacteria, which can't flourish in the oxy-
gen-rich surface water, move towards the more oxygen-free water at the 
bottom of the ocean.25 Of course there are also indicators in human bodies. 
There are structures that respond in a regular way to blood temperature; 
they are part of a complex feedback system that maintains a more or less 
constant blood temperature by inducing (e.g.) shivering if the temperature 
is too low and sweating if it is too high. There are structures that monitor 
the amount of sugar in the blood and its sodium content. There are struc-
tures that respond in a regular way to light of a certain pattern striking the 
retina, to the amount of food in your stomach, to its progress through your 
digestive system, and so on. Presumably there are structures in the brain 
that are correlated with features of the environment; it is widely assumed 
that when you see a tree, there is a distinctive pattern of neural firing (or 
some other kind of structure) in your brain that is correlated with and 
caused by it. 
Now we can, if we like, speak of 'content' here; it's a free country. We 
can say that the mercury column, on a given occasion, has a certain con-
tent: the state of affairs correlated with its having the height it has on that 
occasion. We could say, if we like, that those structures in the body that 
indicate blood pressure or temperature or saline content have a content 
on a given occasion: whatever it is that the structure indicates on that oc-
casion. We could say, if we like, that the neural structure that is correlated 
with my looking at a tree has a content: its content, we could say, is what it 
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indicates on that occasion. We can also, if we like, speak of information in 
these cases: the structure that registers my blood temperature, we can say, 
carries the information that my blood temperature is thus and so. 
What is crucially important to see, however, is that this sort of con-
tent or information has nothing as such to do with belief, or belief content. 
There are those who-no doubt in the pursuit of greater generality-gloss 
over this distinction. Donald T. Cambell, for example, in arguing for the 
relevance of natural selection to epistemology, claims that II evolu tion-
even in its biological aspects-is a knowledge process. fl26 Commenting on 
Cambell's claim, Franz Wuketits explains that 
The claim is based on the idea that any living system is a "knowledge-
gaining system." This means that organisms accumulate information 
about certain properties of their environment. Hence life generally 
may be described as an information process, or, to put it more pre-
cisely, an information-increasing process.27 
At any rate Wuketits has the grace to put 'knowledge' in scare quotes here. 
Knowledge requires belief; correlation, causal or otherwise, is not belief; 
information and content of this sort do not require belief. Neither the ther-
mostat nor any of its components believes that the room temperature is 
thus and so. When the saline content of my blood is too low, neither I nor 
the structure correlated with that state of affairs (nor my blood) believes 
the saline content is less than it should be-or, indeed, anything else about 
the saline content. Indication, carrying information, is not belief; indicator 
content is not belief content, and these structures don't have belief content 
just by virtue of having indicator content. And now the point here: I am 
not, of course, claiming that material structures can't have indicator con-
tent; obviously they can. What I am claiming is that they can't have belief 
content: no material structure can be a belief. 
Here someone might object as follows. "You say we can't see how a 
neural event can have content; but in fact we understand this perfectly 
well, and something similar happens all the time. For there is, after all, the 
computer analogy. A computer, of course, is a material object, an assem-
blage of wires, switches, relays, and the like. Now suppose I am typing in 
a document. Take any particular sentence in the document: say the sen-
tence 'Naturalism is all the rage these days.' That sentence is represented 
and stored on the computer's hard disk. We don't have to know in exactly 
what way it's stored (it's plusses and minuses, or a magnetic configuration, 
or something else; it doesn't matter). Now the sentence 'Naturalism is all 
the rage these days' expresses the proposition Naturalism is all the rage these 
days. That sentence, therefore, has the proposition Naturalism is all the rage 
these days as its content. But then consider the analogue of that sentence 
on the computer disk: doesn't it, too, express the same proposition as the 
sentence it represents? That bit of the computer disk with its plusses and 
minuses, therefore, has propositional content. But of course that bit of the 
computer disk is also (part of) a material object (as is any inscription of 
the sentence in question). Contrary to your claim, therefore, a material 
object can perfectly well have propositional content; indeed, it happens all 
the time. But if a computer disk or an inscription of a sentence can have 
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a proposition as content, why can't an assemblage of neurons? Just as a 
magnetic pattern has as content the proposition Naturalism is all the rage 
these days, so too a pattern of neuronal firing can have that proposition as 
content. Your claim to the contrary is completely bogus and you should be 
ashamed of yourself." Thus far the objector. 
If the sentence or the computer disk really did have content, then I guess 
the assemblage of neurons could too. But the fact is neither does-or rath-
er, neither has the right kind of content: neither has original content; each 
has, at most, derived content. For how does it happen that the sentence has 
content? It's simply by virtue of the fact that we human beings treat that 
sentence in a certain way, use the sentence in a certain way, a way such 
that if a sentence is used in that way, then it expresses the proposition in 
question. Upon hearing that sentence, I think of, grasp, apprehend the 
proposition Naturalism is all the rage these days. You can get me to grasp, 
entertain, and perhaps believe that proposition by uttering that sentence. 
How exactly all this works is complicated and not at all well understood; 
but the point is that the sentence has content only because of something 
we, we who are already thinkers, do with it. We could put this by saying 
that the sentence has secondary or derived content; it has content only be-
cause we, we creatures whose thoughts and beliefs already have content, 
treat it in a certain way. The same goes for the magnetic pattern on the 
computer disk; it represents or expresses that proposition because we as-
sign that proposition to that configuration. But of course that isn't how it 
goes (given materialism) with that pattern of neural firing. That pattern 
doesn't get its content by way of being used in a certain way by some other 
creatures whose thoughts and beliefs already have content. If that pattern 
has content at all, then, according to materialism, it must have original or 
primary content. And what it is hard or impossible to see is how it could 
be that an assemblage of neurons (or a sentence, or a computer disk) could 
have original or primary content. To repeat: it isn't just that we can't see 
how it's done, in the way in which we can't see how the sleight of hand 
artist gets the pea to wind up under the middle shell. It is rather that we 
,=an see, to at least some degree, that it can't be done, just as we can see 
that an elephant can't be a proposition, and that the number 7 can't weigh 
seven pounds. 
B. Parity? 
Peter van Inwagen agrees that it is hard indeed to see how physical inter-
action among material entities can produce thought: "it seems to me that 
the notion of a physical thing that thinks is a mysterious notion, and that 
Leibniz's thought-experiment brings out this mystery very effectively."28 
Now I am taking this fact as a reason to reject materialism and hence 
as an argument for dualism. But of course it is a successful argument only 
if there is no similar difficulty for substance dualism itself. Van Inwagen 
believes there is a similar difficulty for dualism: 
For it is thinking itself that is the source of the mystery of a think-
ing physical thing. The notion of a non-physical thing that thinks 
is, I would argue, equally mysterious. How any sort of thing could 
think is a mystery. It is just that it is a bit easier to see that thinking is 
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a mystery when we suppose that the thing that does the thinking is 
physical, for we can form mental images of the operations of a physi-
cal thing and we can see that the physical interactions represented in 
these images-the only interactions that can be represented in these 
images-have no connection with thought or sensation, or none we 
are able to imagine, conceive or articulate. The only reason we do not 
readily find the notion of a non-physical thing that thinks equally 
mysterious is that we have no clear procedure for forming mental 
images of non-physical things. (loc. cit.) 
So dualism is no better off than materialism; they both have the same 
problem. But what precisely is this problem, according to van Inwagen? 
"[W]e can form mental images of the operations of a physical thing and 
we can see that the physical interactions represented in these images-the 
only interactions that can be represented in these images-have no con-
nection with thought or sensation or none we are able to imagine, con-
ceive or articulate." As I understand van Inwagen here, he is saying that 
we can imagine physical interactions or changes in a physical thing; but 
we can see that the physical interactions represented in those images have 
no connection with thought. We can imagine neurons in the brain firing; 
we can imagine electrical impulses or perhaps clouds of electrons moving 
through parts of neurons, or whole chains of neurons; we can imagine 
neural structures with rates of fire in certain parts of the structure chang-
ing in response to rates of fire elsewhere in or out of that structure: but we 
can see that these interactions have no connection with thought. Now I'm 
not quite sure whether or not I can imagine electrons, or their movements, 
or electrical impulses; but it does seem to me that I can see that electrical 
impulses and the motions of electrons, if indeed there are any such things, 
have nothing to do with thought. 
Another way to put van Inwagen's point: no change we can imagine in 
a physical thing could be a mental change, i.e., could constitute thought or 
sensation, or a change in thought or sensation. But then we can't imagine 
a physical thing's thinking: i. e., we can't form a mental image of a physi-
cal thing thinking. And this suggests that the problem for materialism is 
that we can't form a mental image of a material thing thinking. But the 
same goes, says van Inwagen, for an immaterial thing: we also can't imag-
ine or form a mental image of an immaterial thing thinking. Indeed, we 
can't form a mental image of any kind of thinking thing: "My point," he 
says, "is that nothing could possibly count as a mental image of a thinking 
thing" (177). Materialism and dualism, therefore, are so far on a par; there 
is nothing here to incline us to the latter rather than the former. 
Thus far van Inwagen. The thought of a physical thing's thinking, he 
concedes, is mysterious; that is because we can't form a mental image of a 
physical thing's thinking. But the thought of an immaterial thing's thinking 
is equally mysterious; for we can't form a mental image of that either. This, 
however, seems to me to mislocate the problem for materialism. What in-
clines us to reject the idea of a physical thing's thinking is not just the fact 
that we can't form a mental image of a physical thing's thinking. There are 
plenty of things of which we can't form a mental image, where we're not 
in the least inclined to reject them as impossible. As Descartes pointed out, 
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I can't form a mental image of a chiliagon, a 1000-sided rectilinear plane 
figure (or at least an image that distinguishes it from a IOO-sided rectilin-
ear plane figure); that doesn't even suggest that there can't be any such 
thing. I can't form a mental image of the number 79's being prime: that 
doesn't incline me to believe that the number 79 could not be prime; as a 
matter of fact I know how to prove that it is prime. The fact is I can't form 
a mental image of the number 79 at all-or for that matter of any number; 
this doesn't incline me to think there aren't any numbers. 
Or is all that a mistake? Is it really true that I can't form a mental image 
of the number 7, for example? Maybe I can form an image of the number 
'7; when I think of the number seven, sometimes there is a mental image 
present; it's as if one catches a quick glimpse of a sort of partial and frag-
mented numeral 7; we could say that I'm appeared to numeral-71y. When 
I think of the actual world, I am sometimes presented with an image of the 
Greek letter alpha; when I think of the proposition All men are mortal I am 
sometimes presented with a sort of fleeting, fragmentary, partial image of 
the corresponding English sentence. Sets are nonphysical, but maybe I can 
imagine the pair set of Mic and Martha; when I try, it's like I catch a fleet-
ing glimpse of curly brackets, enclosing indistinct images that don't look 
a whole lot like Mic and Martha. But is that really imagining the number 
7, or the actual world, or the pair set of Mic and Martha? Here I'm of two 
minds. On the one hand, I'm inclined to think that this isn't imagining 
the number 7 at all, but instead imagining something connected with it, 
namely the numeral 7 (and the same for the actual world and the set of 
Mic and Martha). On the other hand I'm a bit favorably disposed to the 
idea that that's just how you imagine something like the number 7; you do 
it by imagining the numeral 7. (Just as you state a proposition by uttering 
a sentence or uttering certain sounds.) So I don't really know what to say. 
Can I or can't I imagine nonphysical things like numbers, propositions, 
possible worlds, angels, God? I'm not sure. 
What is clear, here, is this: if imagining the numeral 7 is sufficient for 
imagining the number 7, then imagining, forming mental images of, has 
nothing to do with possibility. For in this same way I can easily imag-
ine impossibilities. I can imagine the proposition all men are mortal being 
red: first I just imagine the proposition, e.g., by forming a mental image 
of the sentence 'All men are mortal,' and then I imagine this sentence as 
red. I think I can even imagine that elephant's being a proposition. David 
Kaplan once claimed he could imagine his refuting G6del's Incomplete-
ness Theorem: he imagine~ the Los Angeles Times carrying huge headlines: 
'UCLA PROF REFUTES GODEL; ALL REPUTABLE EXPERTS AGREE.' In 
this loose sense, most anything can be imagined; but then the loose sense 
has little to do with what is or isn't possible. So really neither the loose nor 
the strong sense of 'imagining' (neither the weak nor the strong version of 
imagination) has much to do with possibility. There are many clearly pos-
sible things one can't imagine in the strong sense; in the weak sense, one 
can imagine many things that are clearly impossible. 
What is it, then, that inclines me to think a proposition can't be red, 
or a horse, or an even number? The answer, I think, is that one can just 
:'lee upon reflection that these things are impossible. I can't form a mental 
image of a proposition's having members; but that's not why I think no 
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proposition has members; I also can't form a mental image of a set's hav-
ing members. It's rather that one sees that a set is the sort of thing that (null 
set aside) has members, and a proposition is the sort of thing that cannot 
have members. It is the same with a physical thing's thinking. True, one 
can't imagine it. The reason for rejecting the idea, thinking it impossible, 
however, is not that one can't imagine it. It's rather that on reflection one 
can see that a physical object just can't do that sort of thing. I grant that 
this isn't as clear and obvious, perhaps, as that a proposition can't be red; 
some impossibilities (necessities) are more clearly impossible (necessary) 
than others. But one can see it to at least a significant degree. Indeed, van 
Inwagen might be inclined to endorse this thought; elsewhere he says: 
"Leibniz's thought experiment shows that when we carefully examine the 
idea of a material thing having sensuous properties, it seems to be an im-
possible idea."29 But (and here is the important point) the same clearly 
doesn't go for an immaterial thing's thinking; we certainly can't see that no 
immaterial thing can think. (If we could, we'd have a quick and easy argu-
ment against the existence of God: no immaterial thing can think; if there 
were such a person as God, he would be both immaterial and a thinker; 
therefore . . .. ) 
Van Inwagen has a second suggestion: 
In general, to attempt to explain how an underlying reality gener-
ates some phenomenon is to construct a representation of the work-
ing of that underlying reality, a representation that in some sense 
"shows how" the underlying reality generates the phenomenon. Es-
sentially the same considerations as those that show that we are un-
able to form a mental image that displays the generation of thought 
and sensation by the workings of some underlying reality (whether 
the underlying reality involves one thing or many, and whether the 
things it involves are physical or non-physical) show that we are un-
able to form any sort of representation that displays the generation 
of thought and sensation by the workings of an underlying reality. 
(Metaphysics, pp. 177-78) 
The suggestion is that we can't form an image or any other representa-
tion displaying the generation of thought by way of the workings of an 
underlying reality; hence we can't see how it can be generated by physi-
cal interaction among material objects such as neurons. This much seems 
right-at any rate we certainly can't see how thought could be generated 
in that way. Van Inwagen goes on to say, however, that this doesn't fa-
vor dualism over materialism, because we also can't see how thought can 
be generated by the workings of an underlying non-physical reality. And 
perhaps this last is also right. But here there is an important dissimilarity 
between dualism and materialism. The materialist thinks of thought as 
generated by the workings of an underlying reality-i.e., by the physi-
cal interaction of such physical things as neurons; the dualist, however, 
typically thinks of an immaterial self, a soul, a thing that thinks, as simple. 
An immaterial self doesn't have any parts; hence, of course, thought isn't 
generated by the interaction of its parts. Say that a property P is basic to a 
thing x if x has P, but x's having P is not generated by the interaction of its 
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parts. Thought is then a basic property of selves, or better, a basic activity 
of selves. It's not that (for example) there are various underlying immate-
rial parts of a self whose interaction produces thought. Of course a self 
stands in causal relation to its body: retinal stimulation causes a certain 
sort of brain activity which (so we think) in tum somehow causes a certain 
kind of experience in the self. But there isn't any way in which the self pro-
duces a thought; it does so immediately. To ask "How does a self produce 
thought?" is to ask an improper question. There isn't any how about it. 
By way of analogy: consider the lowly electron. According to current sci-
ence, electrons are simple, not composed of other things. Now an electron 
has basic properties, such as having a negative charge. But the question 
'How does an electron manage to have a charge?' is an improper question. 
There's no how to it; it doesn't do something else that results in its having 
such a charge, and it doesn't have parts by virtue of whose interaction it 
has such a charge. Its having a negative charge is rather a basic and im-
mediate property of the thing (if thing it is). The same is true of a self and 
lhinking: it's not done by underlying activity or workings; it's a basic and 
immediate activity of the self. But then the important difference, here, be-
tween materialism and immaterialism is that if a material thing managed 
to think, it would have to be by way of the activity of its parts: and it seems 
upon reflection that this can't happen.3o Not so for an immaterial self. Its 
activity of thinking is basic and immediate. And it's not the case that we 
are inclined upon reflection to think this can't happen -there's nothing at 
all against it, just as there is nothing against an electron's having a nega-
tive charge, not by virtue of the interaction of parts, but in that basic and 
immediate way. The fact of the matter then is that we can't see how a mate-
rial object can think-that is, upon reflection it seems that a material object 
can't think. Again, not so for an immaterial self. 
True, as van Inwagen says, thought can sometimes seem mysterious 
and wonderful, something at which to marvel. (Although from another 
point of view it is more familiar than hands and feet.) But there is nothing 
here to suggest that it can't be done. I find myself perceiving my computer; 
there is nothing at all, here, to suggest impossibility or paradox. Part of the 
mystery of thought is that it is wholly unlike what material objects can do: 
but of course that's not to suggest that it can't be done at all. Propositions 
are also mysterious and have wonderful properties: they manage to be 
about things; they are true or false; they can be believed; they stand in log-
ical relations to each other. How do they manage to do those things? Well, 
certainly not by way of interaction among material parts. Sets manage, 
somehow, to have members-how do they do a thing like that? And why 
is it that a given set has just the members it has? How does the unit set of 
Lance Armstrong manage to have just him as a member? What mysterious 
force, or fence, keeps Leopold out of that set? Well, it's just the nature of 
sets to be like this. These properties can't be explained by way of physical 
interactions among material parts, but that's nothing at all against sets. 
Indeed, these properties can't be explained at all. Of course if you began 
with the idea that everything has to be a material object, then thought (and 
propositions and sets) would indeed be mysterious and paradoxical. But 
why begin with that idea? Thought is seriously mysterious, I think, only 
when we assume that it would have to be generated in some physical way, 
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by physical interaction among physical objects. That is certainly mysteri-
ous; indeed it goes far beyond mystery, all the way to apparent impossibil-
ity. But that's not a problem for thought; it's a problem for materialism. 
III. Arguments for Materialism 
The above arguments for dualism and others like them are powerful. Like 
philosophical arguments generally, however, they are not of that wholly 
apodictic and irrefragable character Kant liked to claim for his arguments; 
they are defeasible. It is possible to disregard or downgrade the intuitions 
of possibility and impossibility to which they appeal. Further, if there 
were really powerful arguments for materialism - stronger than these ar-
guments against it-then perhaps the appropriate course would be to em-
brace materialism. But are there any such powerful arguments? 
No-or at least I've never seen any. There is the old chestnut accord-
ing to which no immaterial object can cause changes in the hard, heavy, 
massive, massy (messy) physical world; there is the claim that dualism, 
or at least interactionistic dualism, violates the principle of Conservation 
of Energy; there is the charge that dualism is unscientific; there is the 
complaint that soul stuff is hard to understand; there is the canard that 
dualism is explanatorily impotent. None of these has any force at alp1 
However there is one that is perhaps not completely without promise. 
According to Nancey Murphy: 
In particular, nearly all of the human capacities or faculties once at-
tributed to the soul are now seen to be functions of the brain. Lo-
calization studies-that is, finding regional structures or distributed 
systems in the brain responsible for such things as language, emo-
tion and decision making-provide especially strong motivation for 
saying that it is the brain that is responsible for these capacities, not 
some immaterial entity associated with the body. In Owen Flanagan's 
terms, it is the brain that is the res cogitans-the thinking thing.32 
Localization studies show that when certain kinds of mental activ-
ity occur, certain parts of the brain display increased blood flow and 
increased electrical activity. Paul Churchland goes on to point out that 
mental activity is also in a certain important way dependent on brain activ-
ity and brain condition: 
Alcohot narcotics, or senile degeneration of nerve tissue will impair, 
cripple, or even destroy one's capacity for rational thought. Psychia-
try knows of hundreds of emotion-controlling chemicals (lithium, 
chlorpromazine, amphetamine, cocaine, and so on) that do their work 
when vectored into the brain. And the vulnerability of consciousness 
to the anesthetics, to caffeine, and to something as simple as a sharp 
blow to the head, shows its very close dependence on neural activity 
in the brain. All of this makes perfect sense if reason, emotion and 
consciousness are activities of the brain itself. But it makes very little 
sense if they are activities of something else. We may call this the ar-
gument from the neural dependence of all known mental phenomena. 
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Of course it isn't true that it makes very little sense to say that activi-
ties of the immaterial self or soul are dependent in this wayan the proper 
function of the brain; still, this argument from localization and neural 
dependence is perhaps the strongest of the arguments against dualism. 
That may not be much of a distinction; the other arguments, I believe, are 
without any force at all. But perhaps this argument has a little something 
to be said for it; at any rate dependence and localization phenomena do 
suggest the possibility that the brain is all there is. Taken as an argument, 
however, and looked at in the cold light of morning, it has little to be said 
Ifor it. What we know, here, is that for at least many mental functions or 
actions M, there are parts of the brain B such that (1) when M occurs, 
Ithere is increased blood flow and electrical activity in B, and (2) when B 
is damaged or destroyed, M is inhibited or altogether absent. Consider, 
therefore, the mental activity of adding a column of figures, and let's as-
:mme that there is a particular area of the brain related to this activity in 
the way suggested by (1) and (2). Does this show or tend to show that this 
mental activity is really an activity of the brain, rather than of something 
distinct from the brain? 
Hardly. There are many activities that stand in that same or similar re-
lation to the brain. Consider walking, or running, or speaking, or waving 
your arms or moving your fingers: for each of these activities too there is a 
part of your brain related to it in such a way that when you engage in that 
activity, there is increased blood flow in that part; and when that part is 
damaged or destroyed, paralysis results so that you can no longer engage 
in the activity. Who would conclude that these activities are really activi-
ties of the brain rather than of legs and trunk, or mouth and vocal cords, or 
arms? Who would conclude that your fingers' moving is really an activity 
of your brain and not of your fingers? Your fingers' moving is dependent 
on appropriate brain activity; it hardly follows that their moving just is 
an activity of your brain. Digestion will occur only if your brain is in the 
right condition; how does it follow that digestion is really an activity of 
the brain, and not an activity of the digestive system? Your brain's func-
tioning properly depends on blood flow and on the proper performance 
of your lungs; shall we conclude that brain function is really circulatory 
or pulmonary activity? All of your activities depend upon your ingesting 
enough and the right kind of food; shall we see here vindication of the old 
saw 'you are what you eat'? The point, obviously, is that dependence is 
one thing, identity quite another. Appropriate brain activity is a necessary 
condition for mental activity; it simply doesn't follow that the latter just is 
the former. Nor, as far as I can see, is it even rendered probable. We know 
of all sorts of cases of activities A that depend upon activities B but are not 
identical with them. Why should we think differently in this case? 
Perhaps a more promising way of developing this argument would go 
as follows. In science, it is common to propose identities of various kinds: 
water is identical with H20, heat and pressure with molecular motion, 
liquidity, solidity, gaseousness with certain properties of assemblages 
of molecules, and so on. This kind of identification, it might be argued, 
is theoretically useful in at least two ways; in some cases it provides ex-
planations, answers to questions that are otherwise extremely difficult 
to answer, and in others finesses the questions by obviating the need for 
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answers, showing instead that the question itself is bogus, or ill-formed, 
or has a wholly trivial answer. Well, why not the same here? Suppose 
we identify mental activity with brain activity; more precisely, suppose 
we identify such properties as being in pain and being conscious with such 
properties as having C-fibers that are firing and displaying activity in the py-
ramidal cells of layer 5 of the cortex involving reverberatory circuits.34 Then first 
of all, we don't have to answer the otherwise difficult questions, "Why 
is it that when someone is in pain, the C-fibers in her brain are firing?" 
Or "Why is it that when someone is conscious, his brain is displaying 
activity in the pyramidal cells?" (Alternatively, they might have answers, 
but the answer would be pretty easy: "Because being in pain just is hav-
ing firing C-fibers and being conscious just is displaying pyramidal activ-
ity.) And second we will be able to answer some questions otherwise very 
difficult: for example, "Why is it that rapping someone smartly over the 
head interferes with their ability to follow a proof of Godel's Theorem?" 
This identification, therefore, is theoretically fruitful and hence justified 
by the principle of inference to the best explanation (B&S, pp. 24, 45). Still 
further, of course, if mental properties are really identical with and thus 
reduced to neurophysiological properties of the brain, then dualism will 
be false. So here we have another objection to dualism. 
Now first, note the language involved here: the suggestion is that we 
identify, say, the property of being in pain with the property of having 
firing C-fibers. That makes it sound as if it's just up to us whether these 
properties are identical-we can just identify them, if we find that useful. 
But of course it isn't just up to us, and we can't really do any such thing. 
All we can do is declare, perhaps loudly and slowly, that these properties 
are identical; but saying so doesn't make it so (not even if your peers let 
you get away with so saying). 
More important, what about the fact that these properties-being in pain 
and having firing C-fibers, for example, or being conscious and displaying ac-
tivity in the pyramidal cells seem so utterly different? Pain and conscious-
ness are immediately apprehended phenomenal properties; not so for fir-
ing C-fibers or active pyramidal cells. And as for that pyramidal activity, 
if that's what being conscious just is, then nothing, not even God, could be 
conscious but not have those pyramidal cells. So do we have here another 
shiny new argument for atheism, this time from neural science: God, if 
he exists, is conscious, but without a body; neuroscience shows that being 
conscious just is having active pyramidal cells; hence ... ? On the face of 
it, these properties seem at least as different as being chalk and being cheese. 
In fact on the face of it they seem more different than the latter; at least 
any pair of things that exemplify being chalk and being cheese are clearly 
both material objects. How can being in pain be the same property as hav-
ingfiring C- fibers when it seems so utterly clear that someone could be in 
pain without having C-fibers that are firing, as well as have firing C-fibers 
without being in pain? Perhaps it's true that if these properties were iden-
tical, we would have answers to some otherwise difficult questions (and 
avoid some other questions): but isn't it obvious that the properties are not 
identical? Are not both 
(1) Possibly, someone is in pain when no C-fibers are firing 
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and 
(2) Possibly, C-fibers are firing when no one is in pain 
wholly obvious? 
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Well, they certainly look obvious. Maybe identifying these properties 
would have a theoretical payoff; but the properties just don't seem to be 
identical. You might as well 'identify' Bill with his essence: concrete objects 
are so unruly and messy, after all. And why stop with Bill? Why not identi-
fy every concrete object with its essence, thus finessing all those annoying 
questions about the relation between concrete objects and abstract proper-
ties? There is a problem about how God knows future contingents: how 
does he know that tomorrow I will freely go for a bike ride? It hasn't hap-
pened yet, and since it will be a free action when it does happen, he can't 
deduce it from present conditions and causal laws. No problem, mates; 
just identify truth with the property being believed by God. How can we 
so blithely declare these properties identical when they look so different? 
How can we declare (1) and (2) false when they seem so obviously true? 
Now here appeal will be made to Kripke and his celebrated thesis about 
necessary but a posteriori propositions. B&S and others suggest that the ap-
pearance of falsehood for (1) and (2) is like the appearance of contingency 
of such propositions as 
(3) Water is HP, 
or 
(4) Gold has atomic number 79. 
In these cases we have the appearance of contingency; but, so the claim 
goes, the appearance is shown by Kripkean considerations to be illusory. 
We initially think that these propositions are contingent; Kripke shows 
us that in fact they are necessary. As Sydney Shoemaker says in a similar 
context, 
Kripke ... argued that the class of truths deserving this label [i.e., the 
label of being necessary] is much larger than had traditionally been 
supposed. And, in his most radical departure from the traditional 
view, he held that many of these truths have the epistemic status of 
being a posteriori.35 
Among these truths, of course, are (3) and (4). But then once we see that 
this is how it goes in the case of water and H 20, and being gold and having 
atomic number 79, we can apply the lesson to neurophysiological and men-
tal properties. Indeed, according to B&S, 
The crucial question for the issue we have been discussing in this pa-
per is whether a relevant contrast can be shown between the relation 
between water and H20 on the one hand and the relation between 
consciousness and some brain process on the other (43). 
But such a relevant contrast, I believe, can easily be shown. Suppose we 
look a bit more deeply into the relevant Kripkean considerations. Kripke's 
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principal thesis here, of course, is that natural kind terms-'tiger,' 'water,' 
'gold' -function as rigid designators; they are not, for example, as Frege or 
Russell thought, disguised or abbreviated definite descriptions.36 While 
there is a certain amount of controversy about the notion of rigid desig-
nation, what is clear is that the thesis in question is a seman tical thesis, a 
thesis about the meaning or function of certain terms. And that should 
put us on our guard. A semantical thesis about how certain terms work is 
not, just by itself, of direct relevance to the modal question which proposi-
tions are necessary or contingent; what it is relevant to, is the question 
which propositions get expressed by which sentences. Pace Shoemaker, a 
semantical thesis can't by itself show us that the class of necessary propo-
sitions is larger than we thought; what it can show us is that sentences 
we thought expressed contingent propositions really express necessary 
propositions.37 
Accordingly, consider the sentences 
(5) 'Water is Hp' 
and 
(6) 'Gold has atomic number 79'; 
what Kripke shows us is that these sentences, contrary to what we per-
haps originally thought, really express necessary rather than contingent 
propositions. But it wasn't that we were clear about which propositions 
were in fact expressed by those sentences, and Kripke got us to see that 
those propositions, contrary to what we thought, were necessary. It is 
rather that he corrected our ideas about which propositions are expressed 
by those sentences: we mistakenly thought (5) expressed a certain propo-
sition P which we correctly thought to be contingent; in fact (5) expresses 
a different proposition Q, a proposition that appears to be necessary. We 
might have thought that 'water' is synonymous with something like "the 
clear tasteless odorless stuff we find in lakes and streams," in which case 
the sentence (5) expresses a proposition put more explicitly by 
(7) The clear, tasteless odorless stuff found in lakes and streams is 
Hp. 
This is clearly contingent: it entails the contingent proposition that H20 is 
found in lakes and streams. By way of a judicious selection of examples, 
however, Kripke gets us to see (if he's right) that the proposition expressed 
by (5) isn't (7) at all. What proposition does it express? That proposition 
can be put as follows. 
(8) Consider the stuff actually to be found in the rivers and lakes: that 
stuff is Hp. 
That's the proposition expressed by (5). Alternatively, consider the stuff 
we do in fact find in lakes and rivers and name it 'XX'; then 
(8) XXisHp. 
(8) is at least arguably necessary:38 it seems sensible to think that very 
stuff, i.e., HP, could not have failed to be Hp. We are inclined to think, 
perhaps under the influence of mistaken views about the function of kind 
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terms, that 'water' expresses such properties as being clear, tasteless, odor-
less and filling the lakes and streams. Kripke gets us to see that 'water' does 
not express those properties, which could be had by very many differ-
ent substances, but is instead a rigid designator of the stuff that actually 
has those properties, i.e., as I would put it, expresses the (or an) essence 
of that stuff. The difference is between, on the one hand, the term's ex-
pressing the properties we use to fix its reference, and, on the other, the 
term's being a rigid designator (I'd say expressing the essence) of what 
it denotes when its reference is fixed in that way. By analogy, return to 
those thrilling days of yesteryear, when Quine asked us to consider such 
~;entences as 
(9) Hesperus is identical with Venus. 
This may look contingent: we might think 'Hesperus' expresses the 
property of being the evening star, i.e., of being the first heavenly body 
to appear in the evening. Surely it's not necessary that the first heavenly 
body to appear in the evening is Venus-any number of other heavenly 
bodies could have been (and I guess sometimes actually are) the first to 
appear in the evening. But what Kripke got us to see is that in fact 'Hespe-
rus' does not express that property; it is instead a name or rigid designator 
(expresses an essence of) the thing that has that property, in which case 
(9), contrary to what we might have thought, does not express a contin-
:gent proposition after all. 
How does this apply to the case in question, the case of the proposed 
identification of mental properties with neurophysiological properties? 
As follows: in the water/H20 case, what we learn from Kripke is not that 
some proposition we had thought contingent is really necessary; what we 
learn instead is that some sentence we thought expressed a contingent 
proposition really expresses a necessary proposition. What we learn is a 
seman tical fact, not a modal fact. It isn't that there is some proposition 
we thought to be contingent and is now seen to be necessary. It isn't that 
(3), the proposition, formerly appeared to us to be contingent, but then 
was seen, via Kripkean considerations, to be necessary; it is rather that 
(5) formerly seemed to express a contingent proposition and is now seen 
to express a necessary proposition. Our problem was not modal illusion, 
but semantical illusion. So what we have is not a reason for mistrusting 
modal intuition (more specifically, an intuition of possibility); it is rather a 
reason (if only a weak one) for mistrusting our ideas about the semantics 
of proper names and kind names. 
But then there is a large, important and crucial difference between the 
water/H20 case and the pain/firing C-fibers case. In the former, as I've just 
been arguing, the proposed identification doesn't conflict with any modal 
intuitions at all. Indeed, (3) does seem intuitively to be necessary: that very 
stuff could not have been something other than H20. So here there isn't so 
much as a hint of conflict with modal intution. In the latter case however, 
the case of pain/e-fibers firing, there is a clear and wholly obvious conflict 
with intuition. 
(10) Someone is in pain when no C-fibers are firing; 
appears for all the world to be possible; similarly, of course, for 
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(11) Someone is conscious when there is no pyramidal cell activity. 
According to the proposed identification, however, these propositions are 
(of course) impossible. If pain just is the firing of C-fibers and conscious-
ness just is pyramidal cell activity, then (10) and (11) are equivalent, in the 
broadly logical sense, to 
(12) C-fibers are firing when no C-fibers are firing 
and 
(13) There is pyramidal cell activity when there is no pyramidal cell 
activity. 
In other words, the proposed identification of water with H20 goes con-
trary to no modal intuition; the proposed identification of pain with C-
fiber firing, and consciousness with pyramidal cell activity, on the other 
hand, is wholly counter-intuitive. The latter identifications go directly 
against strong modal intuitions; the former does not. 
This objection to dualism, therefore, is no stronger than the others. No 
doubt splendid theoretical advantages would be forthcoming from the 
identification of mental with neurophysiological properties, as with the 
identification of concrete objects with their essences. But these theoretical 
advantages are surely outweighed by the fact that the proposed identifica-
tions are obviously false. Like the other objections to dualism, accordingly, 
this one is without any force. In conclusion, then: there are powerful argu-
ments against materialism and none for it. Why, therefore, should anyone 
want to be a materiaIist?39 
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